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ABSTRACT
With the reorganization of healthcare and consolidation into Integrated Healthcare Delivery Systems,
medical records are increasingly distributed across multiple institutions. Timely access to these medical
records is a critical need for healthcare providers. This document provides an overview of an architecture
for secure retrieval of electronic health information from heterogeneous data sources using Health Level 7
(HL7), internet technologies and readily available software components. CareWebTM , a consolidation of
the electronic records of Boston's Beth Israel and Deaconess Hospitals, was implemented and evaluated
for this project. This report details the technical, political and organizational challenges encountered during
the creation of CareWeb TM and reviews the techniques required to electronically link Integrated Health
Care Delivery Systems and geographically distant information resources.
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1. Introduction
In an era of increasing competition for health care dollars, medical institutions are merging and
consolidating with increasing frequency. Given that the majority of such institutions have heterogeneous
hospital-based computing resources, integrating information systems across merged institutions is a
difficult problem.
The CareGroup was formed in 1996 by the merger of the Beth Israel Hospital, the Deaconess Hospital,
three Boston area community hospitals, and several satellite outpatient clinics, creating a billion-dollar
integrated healthcare delivery system. A major post-merger issue has been the integration of existing
electronic health information to deliver coordinated care to the patients who crossover between CareGroup
facilities. Each site has different legacy systems, different institutional vocabularies and varying
completeness of clinical information.
A standard approach to the unification of diverse information sources is to use a clinical data repository.
Repositories serve as enterprise-wide data warehouses but require substantial monetary and personnel
investments to deploy . The CareWebTM project was conceived to provide a means for the virtual
consolidation of the health information at these heterogeneous institutions while minimizing time,
personnel and cost.
CareWebTM is an actual implementation of the W3EMRS architecture [1]. The W3EMRS architecture
provides the first approach to delivering a unified virtual medical record for both inpatient and outpatient
care settings. With W3EMRS, a request for information is made via a web browser to a consolidator.
The consolidator requests information from several heterogeneous hospital, clinic and office sites. A site
server is implemented for each site which interprets the consolidator request and returns the requested
information as an HL7 data stream. The consolidator merges data from all responding sites and returns a
unified web page to the web browser. The W3EMRS project is an example of a World Wide Web-based
approach that has delivered promising results in a laboratory environment.
On-going research continues to support the suitability of web technology for clinical applications, although
deployed systems in a clinical environment are rare. Several authors have explored the use of the web for
display of medical records for a single institution [2,3] . Others have proposed multi-institutional
approaches [4] utilizing a monolithic central repository, updated at relatively infrequent fixed intervals,
which limits the timeliness of data.
CareWebTM uses the World Wide Web to successfully consolidate heterogeneous clinical data across
multiple institutions. CareWebTM implements web-exposed HL7-based [6] medical information servers at
each participating institution in the healthcare delivery network. A central "Consolidator" processes
requests for information from healthcare providers and queries all sites on the network. The Consolidator
then delivers an integrated multi-institutional medical record to the health care provider.
Creating such a system presented many issues, both technical and political, including definition of a
common medical record, creation of a master patient index strategy and implementation of a
security/confidentiality policy.
2. Background
Several systems have been developed to deliver online patient data for use in outpatient settings in a text-
based environment. The earliest and perhaps best known is the COSTAR system. COSTAR, which
stands for Computer Stored Ambulatory Records, derives from the work of Grossman and Barnett [7] and
was originally introduced at the Harvard Community Health Plan in 1968. More than 750 practices
attempted installation and approximately 150 sites still use the software.
Recent descriptions of installations at the Medical College of Ohio [8] and the University of Nebraska [9]
indicate substantial barriers to the wide dissemination of the online patient record. While many of these
barriers are not technological but socio-political, simple problems with interfacing of laboratory systems
and hospital registration systems have led to duplicative data entry and user dissatisfaction. Moreover,
many of these systems including the Regenstrief Medical Record System [10], the Total Medical Record
System (TMR) [11] and the STOR system [12] are paper based, limited to one specialty (medicine) and
rarely integrated with other heterogeneous systems throughout the institution.
Numerous institutional on-line medical record systems have been developed, including the Beth Israel
Online Medical Record (OMR) system [13], the HELP System at LDS Hospital [14], the Diogene system
in Geneva [15] and the BAZIS system in the Netherlands [16]. Each of these systems has focused on the
sharing of data within a single institution to facilitate the process of care. The OMR does include
connectivity to geographically dispersed sites affiliated with the Beth Israel, including two community
practices and 32 specialty clinics.
Today, an information system with a single institutional focus is not sufficient. Hospitals, outpatient
clinics, and urgent care centers throughout the country are continuing to merge to create full-service
medical service organizations. Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center is an excellent example of this trend,
having recently completed a full asset merger that allied the hospital with several satellite emergency rooms
in the Boston area. For these distributed care models to be effective, clinical data must be immediately
accessible at all sites within the medical service network.
Attempts to provide immediate distributed access to medical data have so far either been incomplete, or
implemented only in a laboratory setting. The National Information Infrastructure Health Information
Network (NIIHIN) [2] project created an architecture with a single central repository supplied on an
interval basis with patient data extracted from participating hospitals. This approach suffers from a lack of
timeliness as hospitals may submit data on a monthly or greater interval. Additionally, as each hospital
information system evolves, it is up to the central provider to deal with continually changing hospital data.
The DEEDS Data set [5] proposed by the CDC provides an architecture to record emergency department
visits for submission to a central authority for later data analysis. Although it provides a comprehensive
means to exchange emergency department data, it provides no means for recording inpatient data and
exchanging inpatient test results.
The W3EMRS architecture [17,18] provides the first approach to delivering a unified virtual medical
record for both inpatient and outpatient care settings. With W3EMRS, a request for information is made
via a Web browser to a consolidator The consolidator issues requests for information to several
heterogeneous hospitals, clinics and offices. A site server is implemented for each site which interprets
the consolidator request and returns the requested information as an HL7 data stream. The consolidator
merges data from all responding sites and returns a unified Web page to the requesting browser. The
W3EMRS project has implemented a cross institutional medical record which includes demographics,
problems, medications, allergies, notes and visits but does not include test results nor multimedia objects.
The W3EMRS project is an example of a World Wide Web based approach that has delivered promising
results in a laboratory environment..
The Regenstrief Medical Record System (RMRS) is used at three hospitals on the Indiana University
Medical Center Campus and more than thirty off campus clinical sites. Recently, this system has been
extended to use Web Browser clients for display and entry of data. Their recent experience with Web
technology demonstrates success with the GUI interface, platform independence, security and
straightforward integration. [19]
The University of Minnesota has deployed Web clients to interface to its Clinical Information System.
Specifically, Clinical Laboratory Result Reporting, Microbiology Display, forms based order entry and
hospital policy and procedures have been Web enabled. They conclude that the Web-based interface poses
few limitations and has met a substantial number of their clinical information needs. [20]
The System for Text Archive and Retrieval (STAR) project at the University of Missouri has implemented
a complex architecture providing access to text based legacy system records using Web clients. [21]
From the work done on cross-institutional records thus far, it is clearly advantageous to link existing
heterogeneous sites in real-time to eliminate the problems created by infrequent data deliveries to central
repositories. From the Web interfaces implemented by several institutions there is compelling evidence
that the Web browser can be used successfully as an access method for both text-based medical records and
multimedia objects.
3. Data Sharing
3.1 Devising Common Medical Record
To create an integrated medical record across heterogeneous institutions, the data elements to be shared
must be identified. Several authors have defined common medical records for cross-institutional
exchange. Examples include the EMDS[2] dataset from the NIIHIN] project and the DEEDS[3] dataset
from the Centers for Disease Control.
To create a CareWeb common medical record, we explored the datasets of the healthcare information
systems deployed in the CareGroup hospitals. Some institutions, such as the Beth Israel hospital, have
complete online medical records with detailed notes for most visits and procedures [22]. Others, such as
the Deaconess-Glover, currently keep only basic demographic and visit information on-line.
The power of the CareWebTM concept is its ability to provide a consolidated view of the existing records of
multiple institutions. To maximize the information displayed, we designed a common medical record that
includes patient demographics, medications, allergies, visits and notes. For the initial deployment of
CareWebTM , we elected to limit our data exchange to text and we did not include multimedia objects such
as EKG's, X-rays, and heart sound recordings. This is left to future work (section 7.4)
The common medical record is presented below, with annotations indicating the details of the data to be
shared.
The patient demographics common medical record contains the following fields:
CAREWEB FIELD NAME DESCRIPTION & NOTES
Patient ID An identifier for a person which allows the appropriate linkages of
patient information. This is used exclusively as a unique identifier
and there is no intelligence built into this key. The true logical
identifier is a combination of attributes (SSN, DOB, name, etc...)
which should be specified by the Master Patient Index.
Patient's Last Name The current legal last name of a person. This attribute is synonymous
with family name or surname.
Patient's First Name The current legal first name of a person. It is also referred to as the
given name.
Patient's Middle Name The current legal middle name of the person.
Patient's Suffix The suffix of the person's name. Suffix refers to hereditary order,
such as Jr., Sr., III, or IV.
Patient's Prefix The person's official title such as Dr, Mr, or Mrs.
Mother's First Name This attribute is used for identification purposes only.
Father's First Name This attribute is used for identification purposes only.
Date of Birth The date and time of the person's birth. This is used as standard
identifying information that helps distinguish between patients with
the same name. When available, it can be used to calculate a person's
age.
Sex A classification based on reproductive function for a person.
Female(F), Male(M), Other(O), Unknown (U)
Patient Alias's Last Name The last name in a person's alias. Aliases include nicknames,
previously used names resulting from marriages, and legal changes of
name. Aliases are recorded to longitudinally piece together a person's
health care history even when a name may change.
Patient Alias's First Name The first name in a person's alias.
Patient Alias's Middle Initial or The middle name in a person's alias.
Name
Patient Alias's Suffix
Patient Alias's Prefix
Race Patient reported racial background
Address (Street Number and The street location or other designation, such as an internal code, for
Name) the address.
Address (Other)
Address City The city or township for the address.
Address State The state, territory, or district for the address.
Address Zip Code The zip code for the address.
Address Country The country in which the address is located.
Home Phone Number The specific contact address for a person. The phone number may be
prefaced with the country code and may have an extension number
attached. Telephone numbers are useful for patient follow-up and for
contacting providers. The contact address may also be an email
address.
Business Phone Number The specific contact address for a person. The phone number may be
prefaced with the country code and may have an extension number
attached. Telephone numbers are useful for patient follow-up and for
contacting providers. The contact address may also be an email
address.
Primary Language Two character code
Marital Status Single(S), Married(M), Divorced(D), Widowed(W)
Religion Two character code
Social Security Number The personal identification number assigned by the US Social Security
Administration. Social Security Number is frequently used as an
individual identifier and may be useful for linkage with some outside
data systems. Not all patients will have SSNs (newborns, illegal
aliens, international patients) though. The Master Patient Index will
assign a unique identifier for a person, recorded in person ID, based
on the values entered in name, social security number, date of birth,
etc...
Ethnic Group Two character code
Birth Place City, State, Country
The problem list common medical record contains the following fields:
CAREWEB FIELD NAME DESCRIPTION & NOTES
Problem ID The numerical encoding of the problem
Problem Name A short name for the problem on a person's problem list. The problem list
contains a running list of historical, chronic medical problems that provides
significant information to other health care providers. The source of the
problem list could be a diagnosis or just general notes entered by a
physician.
On occasion, providers will enter items on a problem list that are not related
to an encounter. Examples include finding out something about a patient
from another family member, or from a physician that does not participate
in the CareWeb system. Primary care physicians should also do a quarterly
review and update of CareWeb data which may or may not be related to an
encounter.
Problem Coding Standard ICD-9
Problem Established Date Date the problem was entered in the person's problem list. This attribute
provides some indication of currency, accuracy, and validation for health
care providers.
Problem Life Cycle Status Only active problems are included in the CareWeb problem list.
The medications common medical record contains the following fields:
CAREWEB FIELD NAME DESCRIPTION & NOTES
Medication ID The numerical encoding of the medication
Medication Name The trade or catalog name for a drug. The product names used in the
National Drug Code Directory are generally those supplied by the labelers
(firms) as required under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.
Coding Standard National Drug Code Directory.
Dose The quantity or amount of the medication in a single dose. The
knowledge of how often a medication is given is important in deciding
potential changes in therapy from a given encounter. It is also important
in estimating the potential supply of medication in a household in the
event of an overdose.
Quantity Dispensed The actual quantity supplied
Dosage Units Code An encoded indication of how the dosage is measured in units.
Dosage Units Text An free text indication of how the dosage is measured in units.
Provider Admin Instructions Additional instructions or comments providing further information about
the drug or medication. This could include special instructions for
constructing a custom preparation, or notes on when and how to reduce a
dosage amount.
The allergies common medical record contains the following fields:
CAREWEB FIELD NAME DESCRIPTION & NOTES
Allergy Code The numerical encoding of the medication
Allergy Name The name of the allergen or agent that can cause an allergic or adverse
reaction in a person. Emergency department providers routinely collect
allergy information to establish or rule out the use of certain drugs during
the course of treatment.
Allergy Coding Standard No coding standard identified for Allergies
Identification Date The date or estimated date that any adverse reaction to a specific allergen or
element was first encountered by a person.
The visits common medical record contains the following fields:
CAREWEB FIELD NAME DESCRIPTION & NOTES
Patient Class Emergency (E), Inpatient (I), Outpatient(O)
Admit Date/Time The date and time that the encounter began for a patient which could be
either the patient's arrival time or the registration time. This information
provide a close approximation as to how long the encounter lasted.
Discharge Date/Time The date and time that the encounter ended, either the discharge or
departure time stamp.
Admit Reason Code The numerical encoding of the admission diagnosis
Admit Reason Name A short name or description of the reason for the encounter. In emergency
departments, this is often known as the chief complaint and may be
recorded using the patient's terminology. For other types of encounters,
such as outpatient or home care, the encounter reason may be more generic
and may not indicate a specific complaint.
Admit Reason Code Table ICD-9.
The notes common medical record contains the following fields:
CAREWEB FIELD NAME DESCRIPTION & NOTES
Observation Date/Time The actual date and time of the recorded observation.
Observation Value The classification code specified in the ICD9 scheme that will be used for
diagnoses. ICD9 codes are used to facilitate data analysis, common
interpretation, statistical data reporting, and claims reimbursement.
Observer ID An identification number for a health care provider which allows for the
identification of a provider but maintains confidentiality of the identity of
the provider. This element should be based on the Health Care Financing
Administration's National Provider Identification File.
Observer Last Name The current legal last name of a person. This attribute is synonymous with
family name or surname.
Observer First Name The current legal first name of a person. It is also referred to as the given
name.
Observer Middle Initial The current legal middle name of the person.
Observer Suffix The suffix of the person's name. Suffix refers to hereditary order, such as
Jr., Sr., III, or IV.
Observer Prefix The person's official title such as Dr, Mr, or Mrs.
Observer Degree The short character designation for an educational degree, such as PhD or
MD.
3.2 Strategies for the Master Patient Index
Much work has been done on the details of creating master patient indexes [23]. Examining the types of
demographic data available across the CareGroup institutions, we elected to use two master patient index
strategies.
For competent patients who are able to communicate identifying information, we elected to use patient last
name, patient first name, date of birth, gender, mother's first name and father's first name to identify
patients uniquely. Although not perfect, we believe that this strategy will suffice for more than 85% of our
patients. [31]
For incompetent or critical patients, we elected to use patient last name, patient first name, date of birth and
gender. Although potentially not precise enough to identify patients uniquely, we believe that this
strategy will maximize the information available to a health care provider about an otherwise non-
communicating patient.
Further validation of the efficacy of this master patient index strategy will be the subject of future
investigation (section 7.3)
3.3 Vocabulary Issues
Each institution in the CareGroup has a different institutional vocabulary. While the Beth Israel Hospital
problem list might include Hypertension, the Deaconess Hospital problem list might include High Blood
Pressure.
Much work has been done in the past on uniform vocabularies such as SNOMED, MeSH and the
MetaThesarus. For the initial CareWeb deployment we elected to display the institution specific
vocabularies and not attempt a uniform vocabulary conversion. An interface to the MetaThesarus has
been designed and is in the process of implementation. (section 7.5)
4. Architecture
4.1 Overview
The clinical data at the Beth Israel Hospital is stored in a comprehensive, custom built MUMPS based
system composed of 28,000 programs. The clinical data at the Deaconess Hospital is stored in a Sybase
clinical data repository.
CareWebTM site servers operate behind the web servers of each hospital and create a link to the underlying
legacy systems at each institution. These site servers interpret incoming HL7 requests for information,
translate them into specific legacy system queries and package the resulting information into an HL7
response.
To allow users to query multiple hospitals simultaneously, we developed a CareWebTM "Consolidator",
which processes user requests, dispatches them to multiple hospitals' site servers, and processes the
information retrieved
Figure 1 - The CareWebTM Architecture
A typical session begins when a health care provider on a standard web browser creates a query for
information by specifying patient identification. This information is submitted via standard HTML forms
to the Consolidator. The Consolidator generates an HL7 request for information to both the Beth Israel
and Deaconess site servers. The site servers return HL7 encoded demographics, problems, medications,
allergies, notes and visits. The Consolidator interprets the incoming messages and creates a single unified
presentation which it sends back to the health care provider as a series of web pages. Full navigational
control is enabled with tool bars that allow the medical record to be scanned using a tab folder-like
paradigm.
The CareWebTM project was implemented using Visual Basic complemented by ActiveX components for
HL7 messaging, HTTP communications, and legacy system interfacing. The Consolidator and site servers
were created as multithreaded, interrupt-driven Internet Information Server Active Server Pages [24].
4.2 Site Servers
Site servers reside at each hospital which participates in CareWebTM. The Beth Israel and Deaconess site
servers are were created as Active Server pages calling OLE Automation methods coded in Visual Basic.
Each site server interprets receives an incoming HL7 message from the consolidator, parses the message
and retrieves the desired information from the hospital's legacy system which is repackaged into HL7 and
returned to the consolidator. The two basic components found in a site server are the HL7 messaging and
legacy system interfacing.
4.2.1 HL7 Messaging
Health Level Seven provides a series of standards that can be used between collaborators to exchange
healthcare information. However , the standard provides such a flexible array of options that there is no
single correct way to exchange a particular piece of data. For example, a discharge diagnosis could occur
in the Problem segment (PRB), the Visit segment (PV1) or as an observation (OBR). Collaborators who
wish to exchange data using HL7 must agree upon a common semantic mapping for exchange. The
following is the HL7 mapping of the common medical record data which was agreed upon by the W3-
EMRS collaborative and used in the implementation of CareWeb.
PID Segment
Field Value Field Component
1 Patient ID : 3 0
2 Patient's Last Name : 5 1
3 Patient's First Name : 5 2
4 Patient's Middle Initial or Name : 5 3
5 Patient's Suffix (e.g ., Jr or II) : 5 4
6 Patient's Prefix (e.g., Dr) : 5 5
7 Mother's Maiden Name (Last Name only): 6 1
8 Date of Birth : 7 0
9 Sex (F, M, O, U) : 8 0
10 Patient Alias's Last Name : 9 1
11 Patient Alias's First Name : 9 2
12 Patient Alias's Middle Initial or Name : 9 3
13 Patient Alias's Suffix : 9 4
14 Patient Alias's Prefix : 9 5
15 Race : 10 0
16 Address ( Street Number and Name ) : 11 1
17 Address ( Other Number and Name ) : 11 2
18 Address( City) : 11 3
19 Address ( State or Province) : 11 4
20 Address( Zip Code) : 11 5
21 Address( Country) : 11 6
22 Phone Number ( Home ) : 13 1
23 Phone Number ( Business ) 14 1
24 Primary Language : 15 2
25 Martial Status (A, D, M, S, W) 16 0
26 Religion : 17 0
27 Social Security Number : 19 0
28 Ethnic Group : 22 0
29 Birth Place : 23 0
PRB Segment
Field Value Field Component
1 Problem ID : 3 1
2 Problem Name : 3 2
3 Problem Coding Standard i.e. ICD-9 3 3
4 Problem Established Date 7 0
5 Problem Life Cycle Status (e.g: "Active") 14 2
RXE Segment
Field Value Field Component
1 Medication ID : 2 1
2 Medication Name : 2 2
3 Medication Coding Standard i.e. NDC 2 3
Dose
Quantity dispensed
Dosage units code i.e. mg
Dosage units text i.e. milligrams
Provider Dosing Instructions ( Text)
Prescription Number
AL1 Segment
Value
Allergy ID
Allergy Name
Allergy Coding Standard
Allergy Date
Field
PV1 & PV2 Segments
Value
Patient Class ( U,E,I,O,P,R,B)
Visit start date
Visit end date
Diagnosis ID
Diagnosis Name
Diagnosis Coding Standard i.e. ICD-9
Field
OBR & OBX Segments
Value Field
Observation Date/Time
Observation Text
Responsible Observer ID
Responsible Observer's Last Name
Responsible Observer's First Name
Responsible Observer's Middle Initial
Responsible Observer's Suffix ( e.g: Jr.) :
Responsible Observer's Prefix ( e.g: Dr.) :
Responsible Observer's Degree (e.g: MD)
Component Segment
7 0 OBR
5 0 OBX
16 1 OBX
16 2 OBX
16 3 OBX
16 4 OBX
16 5 OBX
16 6 OBX
16 7 OBX
Additionally, we had to agree upon the mapping for HL7 queries for information. Query types for
Demographics(D) Problems (P), Medications (M), Allergies (A), Visits(V), Notes (N) were defined. Any
combinations of these queries can be issued simultaneously. For example, putting the letters PMA in the
Query Type segment will result in problems, medications and allergies being returned from the single
query.
Field
1
2
3
4
Component
Field
1
2
3
4
5
6
Component
2
44
45
3
3
3
Segment
0 PV1
0 PVI
0 PVI
1 PV2
2 PV2
3 PV2
Field
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
QRD Segment
Field
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
QRF Segment
Field
1
2
3
4
Value
Date/Time of Query
Query Format Code
Query Priority
Query ID
# of records desired
Patient Name
Subject Filter
Department
Value
Query location
Query From Date/Time
Query Thru Date/Time
Query Type (DPMAVN)
Using these HL7 semantic mappings of the CareWebTM common medical record (patient demographics,
medications, allergies, visits and notes) and queries we created site servers which populated these mappings
via interfaces to each institution's legacy systems.
4.2.2 Legacy System Interfacing to M
The Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center East Campus system contains over 20 gigabytes of healthcare
information stored in MUMPS data structures. MUMPS (Massachusetts General Hospital Utility Multi-
Programming System) provides a rich set of database tools that have made it the foundation of numerous
hospital information systems. A major impediment to web-enabling MUMPS data is the difficulty of
exporting the data outside of MUMPS. In the past, MUMPS required a dedicated machine and provided
both operating system and programming environments. Today, with the advent of Intersystems Open M
(ISM), Data Tree Systems M (DTM) and Micronetics M (MSM), which run in standard UNIX and
Windows environments, connectivity options are more varied.
Field Component
1
2
3
4
7
8
9
10
Component
1
2
3
4
Field
All connectivity options share a common structure. M is an interpreted language which creates a
proprietary data structure accessible only by M. Interfacing necessitates the creation of a server in M
which requires to incoming client requests for information.
User Interface
Application
M Client
M Server
M Database
Figure 2 - M Interfacing Architecture
Three models of this client/server architecture are currently available; the Open Database Connectivity
(ODBC) model, the Visual M model and the M/Weblink model. Each has advantages and disadvantages
with respect to robustness, development time and transportability.
4.2.2.1 Open Database Connectivity
Microsoft created the Open Database Connectivity standard to allow its database tools including Visual
Basic, Access, and Query to retrieve data from diverse non-Microsoft databases. ODBC consists of two
essential parts, a client and an ODBC driver. The client is used to generate Standard Query Language
(SQL) requests from the database. The driver interprets these requests, connects to the database and
retrieves the desired information. In the ODBC standard, a specific driver must exist for every type of
database the user wants to access. Furthermore, the database may reside on a local computer or a distant
computer. The ODBC driver establishes the connection using whatever protocols are necessary.
ODBC connections are inherently slow because the driver must connect to the database, which may entail
opening a TCP/IP connection, logging on to the distant system and retrieving information about available
data structures.
Access and Visual Basic, for example, issue and an ODBC query for every field in the database they are
querying. For large databases with hundreds of fields, the amount of network traffic generated by a single
ODBC request is significant.
The ODBC model for data access is attractive because it abstracts all interactions with the database into
simple SQL commands. Regardless of whether the database is in Sybase, Oracle, or M the ODBC interface
is the same. This abstraction makes development using ODBC both straightforward and transportable.
With regard to CareWebTM , using ODBC is especially attractive because no code in the site server requires
any knowledge of the underlying database. If the M database changes structure, the ODBC driver handles
all changes without having to change the site server. If the M database is replaced by an Oracle database,
no site server changes are necessary because the ODBC driver is responsible for all data operations.
The ODBC model for M interfacing appears:
Web Server
Site Server
ODBC Client
ODBC Server
Legacy Data
Figure 3 - ODBC Model
In the above model, the hospital web server receives an HL7 request from the CareWebTM Consolidator.
The site server parses the request and formulates an SQL query. The SQL query is passed via ODBC from
the ODBC client to the ODBC server. The legacy data is retrieved and returned to the ODBC client. The
data is repackaged into HL7 and returned to the Consolidator via the hospital web server.
Two vendors have implemented ODBC systems for M. The first is Intersystems, the suppliers of Open
M/SQL Relational Client/Server. The second vendor is KB Systems, which has created the KB_SQL
product.
Intersystems Open M/SQL Relational Client/Server
The Intersystems product was created in 1993. Versions of this product have been evaluated by the
Brigham and Women's Information Systems Applied Technolgies group and by the Beth Israel Deaconess
Center for Clinical Computing. Both groups concluded that the ODBC driver had unacceptably slow
response times. Since this initial testing, Intersystems has released several new versions of the ODBC
driver which do improve response times. However, testing of version 2.0 M/SQL ODBC client
demonstrated performance that is still too slow for a mission critical application. Typical times to connect
to M tables varies between ten and fifteen seconds. Typical data retrieval times are shown below with a
comparison to Microsoft SQL Server typical retrieval times.
PRODUCT SELECT 1 RECORD FROM 20000 SELECT 20000 RECORDS
Intersystems M/SQL 15 seconds 240 seconds
Microsoft SQL Server <1 second 21 seconds
Robustness was evaluated by performing 100 successive queries. 80 queries succeeded, 10 were ignored
completely and 10 caused the M server to crash. Intersystems notes that a client request which generates
an M error will generally cause the server to shut down. Mission critical applications require that each
user's actions should not effect other users. The M/SQL ODBC system does not provide this protection.
Both poor performance and significant instability make the Intersystems M/SQL system unusable for
ODBC access. Intersystems notes that another version which corrects these issues will be available.
KB_SQL
KB Systems has produced an ODBC product called KB_SQL which has been selected by the Brigham and
Women's Applied Technologies group to be used for all future custom report development. They
concluded that it was well engineered, robust and well-supported. Their benchmark times indicated
however, that it was not suitable for real-time data retrieval for local clients who desire instantaneous
response for queries such as laboratory results. Queries requiring instantaneous response will still be
written in M code.
Performance of the KB_SQL product is excellent. Typical times to connect to M tables averages 1
second.. Typical data retrieval times are shown below with a comparison to Microsoft SQL Server typical
retrieval times.
PRODUCT SELECT 1 RECORD FROM 20000 SELECT 20000 RECORDS
KB_SQL 1 seconds 24 seconds
Microsoft SQL Server <1 second 21 seconds
Robustness was evaluated by performing 100 successive queries. All 100 queries succeeded.
Based on the performance and robustness measures of the KB_SQL product, use of this ODBC solution
seems attractive. However, a serious limitation of the ODBC model is that it updates data in M data
directly and does not launch "filer" programs which cascade updates to other data fields as necessary. For
example, a change to the social security number may require that several other data structures be updated.
Without the ability to call filer programs, ODBC solutions may be limited to read-only access of data.
Currently CareWebTM does not change nor update data, but this issue must be considered for future
applications.
Thus the ODBC solution with KB_SQL provides a standard, straightforward, transportable model to access
M data. It is limited in its ability to update data in that it cannot execute M programs to deal with data
changes that must be cascaded to other fields. Performance and robustness are acceptable.
4.2.2.2 Visual M
Visual M was created by Intersystems to allow programmers to use the graphical user interface
development tools of Visual Basic while supporting easy access to M data structures. Like other models of
M access, Visual M has a client and a server piece.
The Visual M client is a Visual Basic OCX. The server is an M program which accepts client requests.
The Visual Basic programming provides the OCX with a segment of M code or the name of an M program
to run. The OCX then establishes communication with the server and executes the M code. The result is
returned to the OCX and becomes available to the Visual Basic program. The structure appears in Figure
4.
Web Server
Site Server
Visual M
Client
Visual M
Server
M Data
Figure 4 - Visual M Model
In the above model, the hospital web server receives an HL7 request from the Consolidator and this request
is passed onto a Visual Basic Program via the Common Gateway Interface (CGI), Information Server
Application Program Interface (ISAPI) or Active Server Pages (ASP). The Visual Basic application
decodes the HL7 request and selects the name of the M program to run to satisfy the request. The OCX
instructs the M server to run the program and the result is returned to the Visual Basic program. The
patient information is packaged into an appropriate HL7 format and is returned to the Consolidator.
Performance of the Visual M product is excellent. Typical times to connect to M tables averages 1
second.. Typical data retrieval times are shown below with a comparison to Microsoft SQL Server typical
retrieval times.
PRODUCT SELECT 1 RECORD FROM 20000 SELECT 20000 RECORDS
Visual M 1 seconds 22 seconds
Microsoft SQL Server <1 second 21 seconds
In six months of evaluation, the Visual M product has proven to be robust. However, this model
necessitates programming in M and thus requires more development time than the ODBC model. Whereas
the ODBC model took care of all data retrieval automatically, Visual M requires that all data access be
expressly coded in M. If the structure of the hospital information system database changes, then the M
program must be recoded.
However, Visual M is fast, reliable and offers flexibility beyond ODBC approaches because all aspects of
the M globals , M programs and M data filers can be controlled by Visual M.
4.2.2.3 M Web/Link
Intersystems created M/Weblink to provide a robust mechanism for web-exposing M data. The product
consists of two parts, an Information Server Application Program Interface (ISAPI) client and a M based
server. When called, the ISAPI client launches a telnet session to M, starts up an incidence of M and then
executes any program specified. The output of this M program is passed back to the web server. The
model appears:
Web Server
M/Webclient
Telnet to M
M/Web server
Legacy Data
Figure 5 - the M/Weblink model
In the above model, the hospital web server receives an HL7 request from the Consolidator and this request
is passed into the M/Weblink Internet Services Application Program Interface (ISAPI) client. The client
launches a telnet session to the M machine, starts M and runs the M/Weblink server which runs any M
program, passing along the HL7 message as a parameter. This M program is responsible for parsing the
HL7, performing legacy system communications and repacking the legacy data into HL7. The patient
information sent back to the Consolidator as a web page.
The M/Weblink approach maximizes development time by requiring that all components be written in M.
The HL7 parser, legacy system access logic and HL7 message assembly must be done in M. None of
these functions is reusable if M is replaced with another legacy system.
Robustness and performance was evaluated by performing 100 success hits to a sample web page. All hits
succeeded with less than 1 second response time.
In summary, M/Weblink provides a fast and robust environment for accessing M globals via the World
Wide Web. However, all programming and web page development must be done in M, precluding the use
of modern web-authoring tools.
4.2.3 Legacy System Interfacing to Relational Databases
The Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center West Campus stores clinical data in a Sybase clinical data
repository (Sybase SQL Server version 4.9.2) running on a Hewlett Packard 9000 Unix System. Sybase
supports complete Open Database Connectivity (ODBC) operations and thus does not require a separate
product to facilitate data access outside of Sybase.
As an evaluation of Web connectivity options and performance, we created three software systems to web-
expose Sybase data. All tests were performed with Microsoft Internet Information Server 3.0 running under
Windows NT 4.0 with Service Pack 2, and ODBC 3.0.
The first experiment utilized Active Server Pages with Visual Basic Script and the Microsoft Active Data
Objects (ADO) component to display Sybase data as web accessible tables. This implementation creates
and resets the ODBC connection every time the page is requested. We created the script Sybase.ASP as
follows
<HTML>
<HEAD><TITLE>Test ODBC</TITLE></HEAD>
<body BGCOLOR="#FFFFFF" >
<H2>The answer to your request using an ODBC query is </H2>
<HR>
<%
Set Conn = Server.CreateObject("ADODB.Connection")
Conn.Open "careweb","careweb","careweb"
sql="SELECT * from demog"
Set RS = Conn.Execute(sql) %>
<P>
<Table Border=2 width=50%>
<TR><TD WIDTH=25o> Patient ID </TD></TR>
<% Do While not RS.eof%>
<TR>
<TD><% = RS("patiidin") %></TD>
</TR>
<%
RS.MoveNext
Loop
RS.close
conn.close
0%>
</TABLE>
To evaluate both performance and robustness we executed the script 100 times with the following results.
The second experiment also utilized Active Server Pages with Visual Basic Script and the Microsoft Active
Data Objects (ADO) component to display Sybase data as web accessible tables. This implementation
created the ODBC connection when the page is first executed and maintained the connection throughout
the session. We created the script Sybase.ASP as follows
<HTML>
<HEAD><TITLE>Test ODBC</TITLE></HEAD>
<body BGCOLOR="#FFFFFF" >
<H2>The answer to your request using an ODBC query is </H2>
<HR>
<OBJECT RUNAT=Server ID=Conn PROGID="ADODB.Connection"></OBJECT>
<%
Conn.Open Session("ConnectionString")
sql="SELECT * from demog"
Set RS = conn.Execute(sql)
%>
<P>
<Table Border=2 width=50%>
<TR><TD WIDTH=25%> Patient ID </TD></TR>
<% Do While not RS.eoD/o>
<TR>
<TD></o% = RS("patiidin") %/></TD>
</TR>
<%
RS.MoveNext
Loop
RS.close
conn.close
%>
</TABLE>
Global.ASP
<SCRIPT LANGUAGE=VBScript RUNAT=Server>
Sub Session OnStart
Session("ConnectionString") = "dsn=careweb;uid=careweb;pwd=careweb"
End Sub
</SCRIPT>
To evaluate both performance and robustness we executed the script 100 times with the following results.
PRODUCT SELECT 1 RECORD FROM 20000 SELECT 20000 RECORDS
ActiveX in ASP 2 seconds 14 seconds
first execution
ActiveX in ASP 1 seconds 12 seconds
subsequent executions
The third experiment utilized Active Server Pages with and ActiveX component created as a Visual Basic
OLE Automation Server to perform data access.. This implementation created the ODBC connection on
the first execution and held it open during all future sessions. We created the script Sybase.ASP as follows
<%@ LANGUAGE = VBScript %>
The patients in the Sybase table are:
<%
html = sybase.site
O/%>
<% = html %>
Global.ASA
<OBJECT RUNAT=SERVER SCOPE=application ID=sybase progid="sybasesite.sybase"></OBJECT >
Sybase.VBP - uses Visual Basic Data Object with Read Only True, Snapshot mode
Public Function site()
Let site = ""
On Error GoTo site err
Form l.datal .RecordSource = "Select * from demog"
Form 1l.datal .Refresh
Do While Forml.datal.Recordset.EOF = False
Let site = site & Forml.datal .Recordset("pati idin") & vbCrLf
Form l.datal .Recordset.MoveNext
Loop
Exit Function
site err:
site = Error
End Function
To evaluate both performance and robustness we executed the script 100 times with the following results.
PRODUCT SELECT 1 RECORD FROM 20000 SELECT 20000 RECORDS
ActiveX in ASP 2 seconds 14 seconds
first execution
ActiveX in ASP 1 seconds 12 seconds
subsequent execution
We conclude from these experiments with Sybase via ODBC provides robust, high performance data
access which is not significantly changed by using ODBC at the application level, session level or page
level.
The above experiments were repeated with an Oracle version 7.3 database with the following results.
PRODUCT SELECT 1 RECORD FROM 20000 SELECT 20000 RECORDS
Oracle ODBC called 8 seconds 14 seconds
from an ASP Web
Page
PRODUCT SELECT 1 RECORD FROM 20000 SELECT 20000 RECORDS
Session level ODBC in 8 seconds 14 seconds
ASP first execution
Session level ODBC 6 seconds 12 seconds
in ASP subsequent
execution
PRODUCT SELECT 1 RECORD FROM 20000 SELECT 20000 RECORDS
ActiveX in ASP 8 seconds 14 seconds
first execution
ActiveX in ASP 6 seconds 12 seconds
subsequent execution
The Oracle experiments demonstrated significantly longer response times despite identical queries on
similar machines. We attribute this performance difference to Oracle's ODBC driver implementation.
In summary, ODBC provides robust, modest performance access to non-Microsoft databases. Although
ODBC methods are well supported and provide a straightforward path to web-expose data, performance
can vary significantly as a consquence of the ODBC driver implementation.
4.2.4 Web technologies
To receive the incoming HL7 requests and to return the HL7 responses populated with legacy data, the site
server needs a web interface. Several methods are available to web enable site server applications. The
three most commonly used methods are the Common Gateway Interface(CGI), Internet Server Application
Programming Interface (ISAPI), and Active Server pages.
4.2.4.1 Common Gateway Interface
The Common Gateway Interface (CGI) is a method for running external programs or gateways under an
HTTP server. A CGI program acts as middleware between dynamic information, such as an SQL
database, and the web browser. A server responds to a CGI execution request from a client browser by
creating a new process and then passing the data received from the browser through the environment
variables and the operating system's standard input method. Results gathered by the CGI application are
returned using the operating system's standard output method.
In Visual C and Visual Basic, standard kernel function calls ReadFile and Writefile are used to implement
standard in and standard out. The common gateway interface methods, while reliable, have significant
performance and scalability problems.
Existing HTTP servers create a separate process for each request received. The more concurrent requests
there are, the more concurrent processes are created by the server. However, creating a process for every
request is time-consuming and requires large amounts of server RAM. I n addition, this can
restrict the resources available for sharing from the server application itself, slowing down performance,
and increasing wait times on the Web.
As an evaluation of site server functionality using CGI methods, a program was written to return patient
demographics stored in an Access database to a web page using the standard site server HL7 messaging
methods described above. Ten simultaneous requests for information were issued and then repeated 20
times. Although no instability was noted, 100% of CPU time was used for 3 seconds per request and 54
megabytes of memory were used. These experiments are detailed further in section 6.1.
4.2.4.2 Internet Server Application Program Interface
One way to avoid CGI performance problems to to turn all CGI executables into dynamic linkable libraries
(.DLL). The server loads the DLL the first time a request is received and the DLL
then stays in memory, ready to service other requests until the server decides it is no longer needed.
In the Microsoft Windows operating system, dynamic linking provides a way for a process to call a
function that is not part of its executable code. The executable code for the function is located in a DLL,
which contains one or more functions that are compiled, linked, and stored separately from the processes
which use them. There are two methods for calling a function in a DLL.
The first Load-time dynamic linking: This occurs when an application's code makes an explicit call to a
DLL function. This type of linking requires that the executable module of the application be built by
linking with the DLL's import library, which supplies the information needed to locate the DLL
function when the application starts.
The second is Run-time dynamic linking: This occurs when a program uses the LoadLibrary and
GetProcAddress functions to retrieve the starting address of a DLL function. This type of linking eliminates
the need to link with an import library. When used in the context of a web application, these DLL's are
termed Internet Server Application Programming Interface (ISAPI) applications, and are loaded at run time
by the HTTP server.
Unlike .EXE type executable files, the ISAPI application DLLs are loaded in the same address space as
the HTTP server. This means all the resources are loaded at run time by the HTTP server. There is
minimal overhead associated with executing these applications because there is no additional overhead for
each request. Benchmarking experiements (described below) show that loading ISAPI application DLLs in
the same address space as the server create substantially faster performance than loading them into a new
process. In addition, these ISAPI applications scale much better under heavy load.
Since an HTTP server knows the ISAPI application DLLs that are already in memory, it is possible for the
server to unload the ISAPI application DLLs that have not been accessed in a configurable amount of time.
By preloading an ISAPI application DLL, the server can speed up even the first request for that
ISAPI application. In addition, unloading ISAPI application DLLs that have not been used for some time
will free up system resources.
Multiple ISAPI application DLLs can reside in the same process as the HTTP server, while the
conventional CGI applications run in different processes.
As an evaluation of site server functionality using ISAPI methods, a program was written to return patient
demographics stored in an Access database to a web page using the standard site server HL7 messaging
methods described above. Ten simultaneous requests for information were issued and then repeated 20
times. Although 100% of CPU time was used, such saturation occurred for less than 100 milliseconds and
only 32 Megabytes of memory were used. Substantial increases in performance were observed and ISAPI
appeared to be the technology of choice to use for site servers. This experiment is further detailed in
section 6.1.
Microsoft introduced Windows NT Service Pack 2 in February of 1997 and this interval upgrade created
severe instability in ISAPI programs. Rerunning the experiment above resulted in failure rate of 56% due
to errors and incomplete information return. Microsoft's explanation for the new instability was the ISAPI
had been superceded by a new technology, Active Server Pages.
4.2.4.3 Active Server pages
Active Server Pages (ASP), is a compile-free application environment which combines HTML pages,
scripts, and OLE Automation Servers (ActiveX server components) to create dynamic web content.
Active Server Pages provides the flexibility of CGI programs and scripts, without the significant
performance tradeoff. Like ISAPI , Active Server Pages runs in-process with the server, is multi-threaded
and optimized to handle large numbers of users.
ActiveX server components support the Microsoft Component Object Model (COM), and can provide
flexible web-based methods for database and legacy system access.
The Active Database Object (ADO) provides easy access to any OLE/DB or ODBC compatible data
source, including Microsoft Access, Microsoft SQL Server, Oracle, Informix, and Sybase. Further,
ActiveX technology is compatible with legacy interfacing methods described above (Section 4.2.2). The
legacy access business logic is encapsulated in the ActiveX server components facilitating access to
virtually any kind of information accessible from the network.
As an evaluation of site server functionality using ASP methods, a program was written to return patient
demographics stored in an Access database to a web page using the standard site server HL7 messaging
methods described above. 10 simultaneous requests for information were issued and then repeated 20
times. Although 100% of CPU time was used, such saturation occurred for less than 100 milliseconds and
only 32 Megabytes of memory were used. Unlike ISAPI, Active Server page requests had a 0% failure
rate and numerous attempts to create system instability were unsuccessful.
Given its superior performance, robustness and stability, Active Server pages was chosen as the web
interface technology for the CareWebTM site servers.
4.3 Consolidator
The CareWebTM consolidator provides the messaging middleware between the health care provider and the
site servers. The Consolidator interprets the incoming health care provider request, translates the request
into an HL7 query, sends the query via the HTTP post method to each site server, receives the site server
response, and consolidates the collected results into a single presentation.
4.3.1 HTTP Messaging
Experience with the site servers demonstrated that Active Server Page technology provided the best
foundation for web applications and the Consolidator was written in Visual Basic as an OLE Automation
Server called by Active Server Pages. Consolidator HL7 messaging is performed using the same
messaging methods described for the site server.
The Consolidator software implementation required an HTTP messaging component to communicate with
site servers and retrieve information. Several HTTP ActiveX controls products were evaluated including
those from Crescent Technologies, Mabry and Netmanage. The NetManage NEWT ActiveX Control
pack provided the most full featured, high performance, robust suite of Internet messaging components.
A unique advantage of the NetManage HTTP control is its multithreaded architecture which allows the
Consolidator to launch multiple HTTP requests simultaneously and then monitor their progress to insure
timely return of information to the browser as soon as all requests have been answered or a maximum
timeout reached..
4.3.2 User Interface
Once site server information is returned to the Consolidator, the Consolidator parses the information and
creates a visual presentation layer. For ease of use and clarity of function, the presentation layer must
provide an easily navigatable electronic analog to the paper medical record. The final version of the
presentation layer contains seven unique screens - demographics, problems, medications, allergies, visits,
summary notes and full text notes. A toolbar which is analogous to file folder tabs appears at the top of
each screen and provides a consistent navigation paradigm. Each screen is illustrated below in Figures 6
through 12.
Demographics
Site
site status
first name
family name
date of birth
gender
middle name
previous given name
previous family name
previous middle name
race
address
home number
work number
marital status
religion
birth place
SSN
BIDMC-EA
Ok
FRIEDA
ALLEN
19340501
F
M
MARTHA
]ONES
D
A
12 MAPLE
APT 21
NEWTON
MA
02215
617222234
617667123
D
RC
DES MOINE
512341234
BIDMC-WEST
Ok
FRIEDA
ALLEN
19340501
F
M
MARTHA
SMITH
D
A
STREET 101 ELM STREET
APT 14
BROOKLINE
MA
02215
[5 6172221432
4 6176671224
D
RC
ES DES MOINES
€ 512341234
Figure 6 - Demographics Screen
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Problems
Problem Date Problem Name Problem Code
BIDMC-EAST
BIDMC-WEST
05/01/1980
10/22/1996
11/01/1996
05/01/1980
10/22/1996
URTICARIA
OSTEOPOROSIS
INSOMNIA
FX DISTAL RADIUS
FX PROXIMAL FEMUR
Figure 7 - Problem Screen
Medications
Site MedicationDate
BIDMC-EAST 01/02/1996
01/25/1996
BIDMC-WEST 10/02/1994
04/12/1993
Medication
Name
TYLENOL
IBUPROFEN
NITRO SL
PEPCID
Medication Dose
1 PO Q 4 PRN
PAIN
1 PO Q 6 PRN
PAIN
1 PO Q 5 Mx 3
1 PO BID
Figure 8 - Medications Screen
Site
708
733
780.52
813.42
821
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Allergies
Site Allergy Date
BIDMC-EAST 05/23/1973
05/23/1996
BIDMC-WEST 02/25/1983
05/14/1992
Allergy Substance
PENICILLIN
PEANUTS
IODINE CONTRAST
TETRACYCLINE
Figure 9 - Allergies Screen
Visits
Visit Date Visit Reason Visit DX Code
BIDMC-EAST
BIDMC-WEST
01/05/1996
05/01/1995
12/05/1996
03/11/1994
FEMUR FX
CHEST PAIN
FX DISTAL RADIUS
DYSPEPSIA
Figure 10 - Visits Screen
Site
821
414
813.42
701
SN ~'m l I Prolern mdication ll i es I i it 74mt
Ne mrnI I Prohea Iatmioll Immleries I ist I oe
Notes
BIDMC-EAST 11/02/1996
BIDMC-WEST 10/14/1995
Note Author
DR JAMES
HAYES II MD
DR SUSAN
SMITH JR MD
Thank you for refering
this very interesting
patient,
After a thorough
evaluation, we cannot
isolate any
Figure 11 - Notes screen
Note Text
Had telephone conversation with patient regarding continuing care.
Patient desires to transfer care to MGH where his cardiologist, Dr.
Stone will continue to follow him. Patient has no specific complaints
at this time and notes he has been compliant with his coumadin
and PT checks. Informed Drs. Roth and Epstein that patient will
transfer all care to the MGH
Go Back to Notes
Figure 12 - Full text notes screen
Site Note Date Note First Line
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4.3.3 Browser related issues
Much thought was given to the technologies used in the Visual Presentation layer. Possible browser side
visual elements include HTML, Java, and browser side ActiveX components.
The existing infrastructure of the Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center includes 5000 display devices of
which 2000 are personal computers. Of these personal computers, over 50% are 16 bit platforms running
windows 3.1 and Mosaic. Requiring a Java or ActiveX compatible browser would require a major
infrastructure upgrade. Thus, the presentation layer was implemented entirely in HTML without browser
side components, achieving complete browser independence and a low common denominator for browser
technology. The Active Server Page technology on the server side uses ActiveX components, but these
components return plain HTML to the browser and not browser side software components.
Future releases of CareWeb are likely to allow submission of medical information from the browser into
the permanent medical record. These future implemenations will likely require browser side components.
5. Security and Confidentiality
In his 1997 state of the Union address, President Clinton noted that "we should connect every hospital to
the Internet, so that doctors can instantly share data about their patients with the best specialists in the
field."[25]. The security and confidentiality implications of web-connecting the nation's clinical data are a
major impediment to realizing this noble goal.
In 1995, the National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences was charged with evaluating
the practical measures that can be used to reduce the risk of improper disclosure of confidential health
information while providing justified access to those interested in improving the quality and reducing the
cost of care. Their March 1997 report, "For the Record: Protecting Electronic Health Information"
presents the findings of two years of collaborative investigations and site visits.[26]
The section reviews the public policy context, the internal and external threats to organizations which
possess health information and outlines technical and organizational approaches to protecting health
information.
We implemented all of the technical recommendations of the report in CareWebTM . Implementing this
security model presented many issues, both technical and political.
The NRC recommended eight technical practices for immediate implementation and five for future
implementation. We found that the these thirteen recommendations provided the foundation on which to
design a robust security architecture and chose to implement and evaluate them using CareWebTM
5.1 The National Research Council Report
The NRC recommendations are separated into two categories, practices for immediate implementation and
practices for future implementation. This discrimination is made with the assumption that the immediate
practices will suffice as a minimum for the current state of technology. However, as more health
information is available in electronic form and as more security technology becomes generally available,
the need for more complete security implementations becomes necessary.
Practices for Immediate Implementation
Individual Authentication of Users. The NRC site visits discovered that many health care organizations
have generalized login usernames/passwords such as MD for physicians and RN for nurses. To properly
authentic individuals on any computer system containing health care data, every individual should have a
unique username/password for access. Such a policy allows individuals to be held accountable for all
actions taken while logged on.
Access controls. Many healthcare computing systems allow all users to view all information. There is,
however, no good reason for a laboratory technician to read the confidential full text data contained in a
patient psychiatric profile. Healthcare providers should be allowed to view clinical information on a need
to know basis. The most obvious implementation of such controls would be to assign access to different
healthcare computing functions based on job role.
Audit trails. Although newspaper articles highlight the threat of computer break-ins by unauthorized
"hackers" from outside healthcare organizations, inappropriate healthcare data access from inside the
organization is far more common. Normal human curiosity leads individuals not involved in a patient's
care to lookup the records of VIPs, celebrities and fellow employees. If authenticated users are to be held
accountable for actions taken while using the health care computing system, retrievable audit trails that log
all accesses to information should be kept. These logs should include time, date, information accessed,
and user ID. Audit trails should be available for patient review on demand.
Physical Security and Disaster Recovery. Computer terminals should be positioned where they cannot be
accessed by unauthorized users. Unauthorized personnel must be denied access to paper printouts and
electronic storage. Backup tapes should be made frequently and tapes should be housed off-site in the case
of a physical disaster.
Protection of remote access points. Firewalls should be implemented to provide strong, centralized
security and to allow outside access to only those systems critical to outside users. All remote accesses
should be protected by single session or encrypted passwords.
Protection of External Electronic Communications. All patient-identifiable data transmitted over public
networks should be encrypted.
Software Discipline. Virus checking programs should be installed on all servers and downloads from the
internet to servers should be limited.
System Assessment. Audits should be performed on a monthly basis to examine vulnerability to
password cracking programs and to verify procedures implemented to detect system vulnerabilities.
Practices for Future Implementation
Strong Authentication. Healthcare providers occasionally share usernames/passwords or write them
down near a computer terminal. Such practices defeat the authentication, access controls and audit trails
offered by unique usernames/passwords. Authentication is substantially strengthened by requiring that
logon be paired with physical possession of "hardware tokens" such as smartcards, magnetic strip IDs or
devices with constantly changing passwords..
Enterprise-wide Authentication. Healthcare environments typically have many heterogeneous computing
systems. If users are forced to have different logon information for each computer system, remembering
such information is an inconvenience and users will have a tendency to write down login information. To
minimize such behavior, users should authenticate once and then have access to all relevant systems.
Access Validation. In the simplest form of access control, different system functions are available based
on job role. A more sophisticated implementation would tailor content within functions by job role. For
example, a discharge summary could be viewed by both a physician and a billing coder, but details of the
patient's psychiatric evaluation would not appear for the coder.
Expanded Audit Trails. Simple audit trails capture information at a single organization. An expanded
auditing system would provide inter-organizational audit trails that trace information as it passes thorough
the health care complex.
Electronic Authentication of Records. Electronic signature should be used to "sign" submitted medical
records and cryptographic digital signature should be used when retrieving records to insure that records
are not modified during the transmission process.
Security Architecture
To implement the NRC recommendations, we reduced the present and future recommendations to eight
action areas - Strong enterprise-wide authentication, access validation, expanded audit trails, encryption of
public network transmissions, electronic authentication of records, physical security, disaster recovery,
software discipline, and system assessment.
5.2 Enterprise-wide Authentication
We guarantee the authenticity of each user with Security Dynamics SecurlD hardware tokens. These
tokens are small, handheld devices containing microprocessors that calculate and display unpredictable
codes. These codes change at a specified interval, typically 60 seconds. Our implementation requires that
each user accessing CareWebTM begin a session by entering a username, a memorized personal
identification number (PIN) and the currently displayed password from the SecurID device. This
information is transmitted to a security server which authenticates the user and verifies that the correct
password was entered. The security server compares the user-entered password with its knowledge of what
password should have been entered for that 60 second period. If the password does not match, it also
checks the password from the previous 60 second period to account for delays in typing and transmission.
Once a password is verified, the user is authenticated for the entire enterprise for the duration of the web
session or 15 minutes, whichever is less. An encrypted security "cookie" is sent back to the user's browser
and this cookie is automatically used for all future security dialogs. Using Visual Basic Script and
Microsoft's Active Server Pages, we dynamically decrypt the cookie within the web server and invisibly
re-verify authentication before responding to additional requests for healthcare data. The code to perform
this on the fly decryption appears:
<%@ LANGUAGE = VBScript %>
<% function getusero
getuser = ""
dim temp(4)
dim base2()
cookies = request.servervariables("HTTP_COOKIE") & ";"
webidbegin = instr(cookies,"webid=")
webidoffset = 6
if webidbegin = 0 then
webidbegin = instr(cookies,"webid_dom=")
webidoffset = 10
end if
if webidbegin=0 then
getuser-"Username not found"
exit function
end if
webidbegin = webidbegin + webidoffset
webidend = instr(webidbegin,cookies,";")
if webidend=0 then
getuser="Username not found"
exit function
end if
base64 = urldecode(mid(cookies,webidbegin,webidend-webidbegin))
base2len = int(len(base64)/4)*3 -1
reDim base2(base2len)
For i = 0 To int(Len(base64) / 4) - 1
Forj = 0 To 3
tempo) = Asc(Mid(base64, i * 4 + j + 1, 1)) - 32
Next
base2(i * 3) = shiftleft(temp(0), 2) Or (shiftright(temp(1), 4) And &H3)
base2(i * 3 + 1) = shiftleft(temp(l), 4) Or (shiftright(temp(2), 2) And &HF)
base2(i * 3 + 2) = shiftleft(temp(2), 6) Or temp(3)
Next
For i = 16 To base2len
if base2(i)=0 then exit for
getuser = getuser + Chr(base2(i))
Next
end function
Function UrlDecode(sEncoded)
pointer = 1
Do
pos = InStr(pointer, sEncoded, "%")
If pos = 0 Then Exit Do
sEncoded=Left(sEncoded, pos-1) &Chr("&H" & (Mid(sEncoded, pos + 1, 2)))&Mid(sEncoded, pos+3)
pointer = pos + 1
Loop
UrlDecode = sEncoded
end function
Function shiftright(inbyte , shift)
shiftright = Int(inbyte / (2 A shift))
End Function
Function shiftleft(inbyte , shift)
shiftleft = inbyte * (2 A shift) Mod 256
End Function %>
If the SecurID token is lost or stolen, it can be immediately deactivated for the entire enterprise by
disabling it at the security server.
5.3 Access Validation
In addition to storing encrypted username and password information, the security cookie contains the job
role of the user. Displays of healthcare information are generated dynamically by Active Server page
scripts which assemble the multi-institutional medical record. The scripts can tailor delivered health care
information based on the job role indicated by the cookie. In our proof-of-concept implementation, we
have restricted this tailoring of access to specific areas of the medical record such as discharge summaries.
We have not created a facility to scan for and restrict specific content within an area, such as removing a
psychiatric evaluation from a dischange summary.
5.4 Multi-organizational Audit Trails
It has been the security policy of the Beth Israel hospital to provide auditing at the level of the specific
patient queried and the individual menu selections used [27]. CareWebTM implements a complete multi-
organizational audit trail.
In any multi-institutional architecture there are two places to capture the audit - either at the institutional
level where the information is stored (the sites) or at the point where the information is delivered (the
CareWebTM "Consolidator"). We elected to capture the information at the site level. Although only a
single CareWebTM "Consolidator" exists today, CareWebTM could be expanded such that other regional or
national "Consolidators" might query information from the CareGroup institutions. If the audit was
captured at the "Consolidator" level, each institution would have to rely on the security practices of the
"Consolidator" operators. By storing audit trails at each site, each hospital can control and audit the
information that leaves its site, regardless of where it is delivered. Each hospital site server captures patient
identification information, requester, the requester's IP address, date, time, and information requested.
Although information is stored at the site level we have implemented a multi-institutional auditing system
that provides patients with the details of the movement of their medical information throughout the
healthcare enterprise. The auditing query system has the same hardware token authentication and access
controls as are required for any CareWebTM healthcare data request. Once authenticated, an auditor enters
patient identification information and submits the information to an "Auditing Consolidator". This
"Auditing Consolidator" uses secure, password protected Open Database Connectivity (ODBC)
connections to query the audit trails of the individual hospitals. It produces a consolidated report showing
all flows of information about the patient for all institutions.
5.5 Protection of External Communications
The existing legacy systems at the Beth Israel and Deaconess hospitals employ a complex series of
hardware controls which limit internet transactions from outside the institution. Using routers and
firewalls, network administrators limit legacy system access to hardware devices physically located within
the campus.
To create security between a browser running on a user's desktop and the Consolidator web server, we
implemented the Netscape standard Secure Sockets Layer [28]. The SecurlD username and passcode are
only exchanged after an encrypted connection has been established by the Secure Sockets Layer.
5.6 Encryption of public network transmission
For communications between the Consolidator and site servers, we implemented RSA public key
encryption for key exchange, session key cryptography for data exchange, and digital signature for
authentication of the Consolidator and site servers [29]. This is shown in Figure 13.
Consolidator Site Server
Sign HL7 Request Verify Signature
with Consolidator with Consolidator
Private Key Public Key
Sign HL7 Response
with Site Server
Private Key
Generate Session Key,
Encrypt HL7 Response
with Session Key
Decrypt Session Key Encrypt Session key
with Consolidator with Consolidator
Private Key Public Key
Decrypt HL7
Response with
Session Key
Verify Signature
with Site Server
Public Key
Figure 13 - Encryption of Network Transmissions
Each Consolidator HL7 request is signed with the Consolidator's RSA private key. The request is sent to
the site server which uses the Consolidator's public key to validate the digital signature through standard
hashing and signature verification methods. The site server retrieves the information requested and signs
the HL7 response with its private key. The site server then generates a session key which it uses to encrypt
the HL7 response. The session key is then encrypted using the Consolidator's public key. The encrypted
session key and encrypted data are sent back to the Consolidator. The session key is decrypted using the
Consolidator's private key. The encrypted HL7 response is decrypted using the decrypted session key.
Finally, the HL7 response is validated using the site server's public key. All decrypted site server messages
are consolidated into a single web page and returned to the original requesting browser over the Secure
Sockets Layer.
5.7 Electronic authentication of records
The use of hardware tokens for system access also facilitates electronic signature. Since possession of the
hardware device authenticates the user, the SecurID token is used as the official electronic signature for
"signing" all CareWebTM documents and audit trails.
As noted above, digital signature cryptography methods are used for all network transmissions, ensuring
the integrity of all health data delivered. The NRC recommends an implementation of hashing and digital
signature to insure that medical records are not changed on the individual systems where they are stored.
In the CareWebTM architecture we have no control of the integrity of the data stored at each institution. We
have created a secure mechanism to transport each institution's data and can guarantee that the data was not
changed during the retrieval process. The reputability of the data is dictated by security policies of each
institution providing the data.
5.8 Physical security and disaster recovery
The notion of a multi-institutional architecture provides significant physical protection for health data.
Instead of physically locating all patient records in a central data source which is vulnerable to physical
disasters, the CareWebTM architecture depends upon the consolidator which stores no health care
information. All that is needed to restore a physically destroyed "Consolidator" system is to connect
another computer containing the "Consolidator" software and its required cryptographic keys to the
hospital network. Currently, all site servers are geographically dispersed and are locked in secure
computer rooms accessed by electronic keycode. In the CareWebTM architecture we have no control of the
physical security and disaster recovery practices of the individual sites which provide data. However, if
any sites sustain a disaster and cease to provide data, the Consolidator notes that a site is currently
unavailable and provides a virtual medical record comprised of all functioning sites.
5.9 Software discipline
No browser software is installed on either the site servers or the Consolidator machines, precluding
inappropriate downloads. Virus checking programs are in place on all CareWebTM systems and are
executed daily by a system daemon.
On the end-user workstation, we have been careful not to cache pages returned by the Consolidator. In our
laboratory environment we have verified that neither Netscape nor Internet Explorer cache pages that have
been returned via a secure socket connection such as that used by CareWebTM. We cannot protect against
an authenticated user who installs a new type of browser that does cache secure pages. However, all pages
returned by the Consolidator have an HTML header which indicates that they expire on delivery. Even if a
new browser was installed which cached information, this expiration forces the browser to replace each
cached page as new requests for information are made, minimizing the amount of information that is stored
on the end-user workstation.
5.10 System assessment
Daily assessment is performed on both the Consolidator and site server systems. On the Consolidator, a
security log lists all SecurlD tokens used, all failed login attempts, and all changes made to the token
database. Web server log analysis (WebTrends) shows all attempts to contact the Consolidator web server
showing IP address, time, date and page accessed. System assessments are also performed on a daily basis
at each institutional site, per their own institutional guidelines.
6. Evaluation
The evaluation of CareWebTM demonstrates that its implementation is robust, scalable and provides rapid
response times.
6.1 Technical Evaluation
Performance and scalability are significant issues in any client/server architecture. To investigate
performance and scalability of the CareWebTM architecture, we ran several experiments in the Windows
NT 4.0/Service Pack 2 environment on an HP Vectra XU Pentium 150 with 32 Megabytes of RAM and a
3 gigabyte SCSI hard disk.
As discussed in Section 4.2.4, numerous web technologies are available to create interactive web content.
The most commonly used, the standard Common Gateway Interface or CGI is a robust, proven
technology. However, each time a CGI is called, a new process is started which requires its own memory
space and CPU time. This can be a problem if starting a process requires significant overhead. Since the
CareWebTM software is complex and contains several ActiveX components, 3-4 Megabytes of memory are
required per process and startup requires significant CPU resources. As a test of the resources required by
CGI's, we built a web page consisting of 10 frames, each of which simultaneously launches a consolidator
which requests information from one site server. Charting CPU usage and memory requirements, we
obtained the following: following:
Figure 14 - CGI Performance (x range from 0 to 95 seconds, y range from 0% to 100% usage)
The above demonstrates that calling multiple CGI's simultaneously pegs the CPU at 100% usage for
approximately 30 seconds. Further, additional memory is required by each CGI request. The end result is
that as more CGI processes are called, performance becomes increasingly poor and with 10 simultaneous
consolidator requests launching 20 site server requests all on the same machine, response was so poor that
every consolidator query timed out after 15 seconds and returned no information. We conclude from the
above experiments that a CGI based CareWebTM architecture is not scalable.
The basic problem with CGI's is that they are out of process servers launched each time a request is made.
Microsoft has implemented Active Server Pages technologies that create In Process servers residing in the
same memory space as the web server itself. These servers are ActiveX components which process requests
by executing a new thread per request. The result is that very little additional memory and CPU time is
needed per request and program load time is eliminated.
As a test of the resources required by Active Server Pages, we built a web page consisting of 10 frames
each of which simultaneously launches a consolidator which requests information from one site server..
Charting CPU usage and memory requirements, we obtained the following:
[CPU Usae Hi..o.... ......
Figure 15 - Active Server Page evaluation (x range from 0 to 95 seconds, y range from 0% to 100%)
The above demonstrates that calling multiple ASP's simultaneously transiently increases CPU use to 80%
of capacity for a very short time. Memory requirements are not increased as the application is permanently
integrated into the web server. Response time for 10 simultaneous consolidator requests via ASP is under
20 seconds. We conclude from the above experiments that Active Server Pages are both robust and
scalable.
6.2 User Evaluation
As an early evaluation of CareWeb TM , we sought and received Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval
to web-expose selected medical records from actual patients who have records at more than one CareGroup
institution. Patient approval was obtained and patients were allowed to view the CareWebTM versions of
their medical record before making them generally available. Furthermore actual patient names and
addresses were pseudonymized, but medical information was not altered.
The system was evaluated by 25 healthcare providers, chosen at random from both institutions, who
assessed CareWeb's ease of use, response times and utility in patient care. Further evaluation was
performed by 25 information systems staff members who evaluated CareWeb's robustness, security and
potential for deployment in the live environment. The cross-institutional medical record was composed
of patient demographics, problems, medications, visits, allergies, and notes for a selection of sample,
fictional patients. During the evaluation period, the CareWebTM system processed 3000 accesses for
patient information. To document clinician, information systems staff and patients opinions about
CareWebTM technologies, we performed several surveys.
6.2.1 Healthcare Providers
Twenty-five members of the clinician staff of the Beth Israel and Deaconess hospitals were selected
CareWeb Evaluation Data Form
Type: Healthcare provider
Date:
Department: Medicine Emergency Medicine Surgery
CareWeb information is useful Strongly Agree Agree Indifferent Disagree Strongly Disagree
CareWeb is easy to use Strongly Agree Agree Indifferent Disagree Strongly Disagree
CaseWeb is fast Strongly Agree Agree Indifferent Disagree Strongly Disagree
CareWeb protects confidentiality Strongly Agree Agree Indifferent Disagree Strongly Disagree
23/25 healthcare providers strongly agreed that CareWeb information was useful. 25/25 strongly agreed
that CareWeb was easy to use and 25/25 strongly agreed that CareWeb was fast. 23/25 strongly agreed
that CareWeb protects confidentiality.
6.2.2 Information Systems professionals
Twenty-five members of the Information Systems staff of the Beth Israel and Deaconess hospitals were
selected randomly and surveyed as to their perception of the robustness of the security methods
implemented. The survey appears as follows:
CareWeb Evaluation Data Form
Type: IS
Date:
CareWeb is easy to use
CareWeb should be deployed
CareWeb is robust
CareWeb is secure
Strongly Agree
Strongly Agree
Strongly Agree
Strongly Agree
Agree
Agree
Agree
Agree
Indifferent
Indifferent
Indifferent
Indifferent
Disagree
Disagree
Disagree
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
Strongly Disagree
Strongly Disagree
Strongly Care
25/25 information systems staff members strongly agreed that CareWeb was easy to use. 24/25 strongly
agreed that CareWeb should be deployed. 23/25 strongly agreed that CareWeb was robust. 25/25
strongly agreed that CareWeb is secure.
6.3 Future evaluation
To date, the evaluation of CareWebTM has been limited to the proof-of-concept system. Over the next
six months, CareWebTM will be deployed in the live environment of six CareGroup Emergency
Departments. An expanded evaluation of the deployed version will include detailed feedback from the
daily users of the system. To accomplish this evaluation, Emergency Department attending physicians will
be given SecurlD hardware tokens to access this system. The evaluation period will be 90 days.
This future evaluation will examine and evaluate the implementation of CareWeb in the East and West
campus emergency departments. The study will focus on how clinicians integrate the electronic medical
records into their daily work practices and collaboration with colleagues. In particular, we will investigate
how the systems mediate the interactions and relations across the occupational groups, work teams, and
geographically dispersed communities found in each emergency room and between the two hospitals. The
study has both practical and theoretical implications. Practically, the data gathered can facilitate the further
development and implementation of CareWeb. Theoretically the study enhances medical record research
and computer supported collaborative work research which have primarily centered around the use of
information technology within one but rarely across two occupational groups
The study will be a longitudinal ethnographic study which involves data gathering before, during, and
after the implementation of CareWeb. The study will focus on both the groups directly interacting with the
medical record systems as well as communities in the two hospitals indirectly effected by the transition
from one system to another. Through the use of participant observation in the two emergency rooms,
interviews, and review of textual data sources we will create a detailed account of the ways in which
existing medical records (such as OMR in Beth Israel) and the new system (CareWeb) support the work
practices of and relations among the different occupational groups and teams. We will highlight the
similarities and differences between the two settings. The resulting data will consist of field notes, audio
tapes of interactions, interview transcripts, and excerpts from various electronic and paper based
documents such as medical records, emails, organizational charts or meeting protocols. More formal work
flow analysis will also be considered if appropriate.
7 Future Work and new applications
Several projects are currently under which utilize the architectures and software tools developed in the
CareWebTM project.
7.1 Master Patient Index Problem
The CareWebTM project implemented a master patient index strategy described in Section 3.2 which
utilized the patient name, gender, date of birth and optionally the mother's/father's first name. Although
this scheme was face validated and informally evaluated during the testing of CareWebTM , no formal
investigation of this strategy has been performed. We are currently engaged in a collaboration to formally
evaluate master patient index strategies between the databases of the Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center
and Brigham and Women's Hospital.
In this study, we will formally test the hypothesis that a combination of patient name, date of birth, gender
and other relevant data elements will identify patients uniquely enough to enable sharing of electronic
patient records between the emergency departments of the Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center and the
Brigham and Women's Hospital.
This project will produce statistics reflecting the success of correctly matching patients in the databases of
two hospitals and will not exchange actual patient data. By limiting the initial study in this manner, we
minimize the security/confidentiality, organizational and political issues that would be created by sharing
clinical information between different hospitals. To perform the study we will:
1. Obtain IRB approval for this study from both the Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center and the
Brigham and Women's Hospital.
2. Design software to be installed at both the Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center and the Brigham and
Women's Hospital that when given a patient name, date of birth, gender, and other relevant data
elements will indicate that a single match is found, that multiple matches are found or that no matches
are found.
3. Choose 1000 patients at random from the emergency department logs of the Beth Israel Deaconess
Medical Center and use the software to analyze them for matches against the entire Brigham and
Women's database.
4. Choose 1000 patients at random from the emergency department logs of the Brigham and
Women's Hospital and use the software to analyze them for matches against the entire Beth Israel
database.
5. Obtain a count of true positives and false positives by verifying all automated matches against manual
lookups done in the native legacy systems.
6. Obtain a count of true negatives and false negatives by verifying all automated non-matches against
manual lookups done in the native legacy systems.
7. Compute the average number of patient crossovers between the two institutions to verify that sharing
emergency clinical data between the two institutions would benefit a significant number of patients.
8. Compute the sensitivity and specificity of our automated methods to uniquely match patients between
the two institutions.
7.2 Multimedia extensions
The initial implementation of CareWeb exchanges text data from two legacy systems. However, other
information systems at the Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center contain repositories of multimedia
information. To extend the CareWeb architecture, we wish to test the hypothesis that providing a
multimedia electronic patient record through CareWeb will improve the quality of emergency care.
We believe that providing immediate on-line access to clinical multimedia will greatly enhance the
effectiveness of computer systems for emergency clinicians. The amount of information available from
multimedia sources for decision making far exceeds text-based representations of the same data [30]. We
will incorporate multimedia objects such as full-motion video of patients, clinical audio such as heart
sounds, and graphical medical information such as EKGs and radiology studies, and will make these
objects available electronically in the emergency room. To accomplish this, we will
1. Bring a multimedia electronic patient record system into use in the Emergency Department of Beth
Israel Deaconess Medical Center.
2. Design an architecture that allows emergency clinical data to be updated through the World Wide Web
and shared among geographically dispersed emergency treatment areas.
3. Implement a data base of emergency medical record data and integrate it with the hospital's existing
electronic patient record.
4. Integrate multimedia objects into the system, including medical images, full-motion video of patients,
and clinical audio (heart sounds, patient speech)
5. Design and implement security and confidentiality methods for distributed access to clinical data, to
achieve an appropriate balance between patient confidentiality and the need of medical practitioners to
have immediate access to medical data in emergency situations.
6. Develop metrics to assess the use and usefulness of multimedia electronic patient records for
emergency services.
7.3 Vocabulary Server
Working closely with Lexical Technologies Inc., we are investigating the use of the MetaThesaurus to
unify the cross institutional content of the CareWeb virtual medical record. A thesaurus server capability
will be implemented that enables users to retrieve terms and concepts that match an input string, definitions
of terms, and terms with related meanings when creating the CareWeb virtual medical record.
As an important example of a clinically relevant problem domain, the CareWeb thesaurus server project
will focus on choosing problem names to describe clinical conditions. The problem list, the set of clinically
relevant conditions that describe a patient, is at the core of a medical record. Treatment guidelines, clinical
staffing decisions, and under diagnosis-based managed care, patient billing, are all driven by the problem
list. Accurate definition of problems is essential to hospital-based outcomes analysis, to continuous quality
improvement programs, and to public health assessments of the frequency of occurrence of disease and the
efficacy of treatment approaches.
The thesaurus server will be implemented as a CareWeb-compliant middleware component designed to
help caregivers conceptualize problem list entries, and to support enterprise use of problem lists to trigger
alerts and guidelines, capture indications, aggregate patients, and preserve the categorization of patients
across changes in terminologies.
Problems such as "cubital tunnel syndrome," "brain metastases of melanoma," or "psychoses associated
with temporal lobe epilepsy" are an effective way for caregivers to describe their patients even though there
are variations in the meaning and purpose of problem lists from institution to institution. These descriptions
remain useful whether they are re-utilized later by the caregiver who created them, or utilized by other
caregivers during collateral or follow-up care.
Nevertheless, problems in a problem list in a CareWeb Virtual Medical Record are difficult to manipulate
computationally. Specifically, they are non-comparable: the current version of CareWeb is unable to
determine when two different descriptors describe the same or a related problem.
One way to increase the comparability of clinical problem lists is to provide an easy and reliable means for
caregivers to convert relatively casual entries - that are easy to remember, type, and spell - into
authoritative entries in one or more reference terminologies. For example, "CHF" can be converted to
"Congestive heart failure," "mad cow disease" to "Bovine spongiform encephalopathy," and "amenorhea"
into "Amenorrhea". However else they may differ, most enterprise electronic medical records support the
creation of caregiver-entered problem lists. CareWeb compliant reusable middleware components may be
readily applied to increase problem list formalization within institutions.
The thesaurus server will be designed to offer a focused, ordered list of suggestions as quickly as possible.
Specifically, it will provide a function, accessible through the world-wide web, to accept a string as input
and to return suggested terms. This function will support word completion, correction of simple spelling
errors and semantic navigation.
The thesaurus server will make use of the current version of the Unified Medical Language System
Metathesaurus, enhanced with the local problem dictionaries. The Metathesaurus establishes a set of
clinically-relevant concepts, and for each concept provides a concept unique identifier (CUI), a semantic
category, and relationships to one or more other concepts.
7.4 Bili Light
In the Boston metropolitan area, it is common for a baby to be born at one hospital such as the the Beth
Israel Deaconess Medical Center or the Brigham and Women's Hospital, but to seek followup or
emergency care at Children's Hospital of Boston. On presentation to the emergency department at
Children's, the evaluating care providers do not have the benefit of the child's birth records, neonatal
testing or prenatal evaluation.
The Bili Light project is a collaboration with Childen's Hospital of Boston. Working closely with
researchers at Children's Hospital, we will deploy a proof of concept pilot which provides access to
prenatal, maternal and neonatal data for patient clinical care, protects the confidentiality and privacy of all
patient information and uses the CareWeb, W3EMRS and Bili Light uniform standards for secure
electronic data exchange
Two types of patient lookups will be supported by the Bili Light Site Server.
The first is the Identification dialog. The Bili Light consolidator at Children's Hospital requests
information by sending Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center an HL7 message specifying the mother's
name, the mother's date of birth and the child's date and time of birth. The Bili Light site server
returns combinations of mothers and their children that meet or approximate these criteria.
The second is an information dialog which queries for all laboratory results from both mother and child
including blood type, Rh, coombs testing, and complete blood count information.
We anticipate that providing such information to caregivers at Children's Hospital will both reduce costs
and enhance the quality of patient care.
7.5 Affiliated Health Networks of New England
CareWeb was designed to unite the clinical data of the Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center East and
West Campus. As a further evaluation of the scalability of the architecture, we wish to extend the data
exchange from a single integrated healthcare delivery system to a regional collaborative of health care
providers, insurers and government agencies.
The Massachusetts Health Data consortium created the Affiliated Health Networks of New England project
as an organizational model to facilitate such information exchange. Working with the Affiliated Networks,
we have proposed a pilot project to use CareWeb to to provide appropriate access to an interconnected
infrastructure of fiscal, clinical and outcomes databases for both public and private sector
constituencies throughout New England.
This project will extend the CareWeb common medical record from its existing Demographics, Problems,
Medications, Allergies, Visits and Notes to include the 156 data elements of the Center for Disease
Control's DEEDS dataset.
7.51 DEEDS common medical record
The DEEDS dataset was created to foster the collection and distribtion of uniform emergency data. The
elements in the DEEDS dataset are as follows:
Section 1 - Patient Identification Data
Internal ID
Name
Alias
Date of Birth
Sex
Race
Ethnicity
Address
Telephone Number
1.10 Account Number
1.11 Social Security Number
1.12 Occupation
1.13 Industry
1.14 Emergency Contact Name
1.15 Emergency Contact Address
1.16 Emergency Contact Telephone
Number
1.17 Emergency Contact Relationship
Section 2 - Facility and Practitioner Identification Data
2.01
2.02
2.03
2.04
2.05
2.06
2.07
2.08
ED Facility ID
Primary Practitioner Name
Primary Practitioner ID
Primary Practitioner Type
Primary Practitioner Address
Primary Practitioner Telephone Number
Primary Practitioner Organization
ED Practitioner ID
3.01 Insurance Coverage or Other
Expected Source of Payment
3.02 Insurance Company
3.03 Insurance Company Address
3.04 Insurance Plan Type
3.05 Insurance Policy ID
3.06 ED Payment Authorization
Requirement
3.07 Status of ED Payment Authorization
Attempt
3.08 Date/Time of ED Payment
Authorization Attempt
3.09 ED Payment Authorization Decision
2.09 ED Practitioner Type
2.10 ED Practitioner Current Role
2.11 ED Consultant Practitioner ID
2.12 ED Consultant Practitioner Type
2.13 Date/Time ED Consult Request
Initiated
2.14 Date/Time ED Consult Starts
Section 3 - ED Payment Data
3.10 Date/Time of ED Payment
Authorization Decision
3.11 Entity Contacted to Authorize ED
Payment
3.12 ED Payment Authorization Code
3.13 Person Contacted to Authorize ED
Payment
3.14 Telephone Number of Entity or
Person Contacted to Authorize ED
Payment
3.15 Total ED Facility Charges
3.16 Total ED Professional Fees
1.01
1.02
1.03
1.04
1.05
1.06
1.07
1.08
1.09
Section 4- ED Arrival and First
4.01 Date/Time First Documented in ED 4.16
4.02 Mode of Transport to ED
4.03 EMS Unit that Transported ED Patient 4.17
4.04 EMS Agency that Transported ED
Patient 4.18
4.05 Source of Referral to ED 4.19
4.06 Chief Complaint
4.07 Initial Encounter for Current Instance 4.20
of Chief Complaint 4.21
4.08 First ED Acuity Assessment 4.22
4.09 Date/Time of First ED Acuity 4.23
Assessment 4.24
4.10 First ED Acuity Assessment 4.25
Practitioner ID
4.11 First ED Acuity Assessment 4.26
Practitioner Type 4.27
4.12 First ED Responsiveness Assessment 4.28
4.13 Date/Time of First ED Responsiveness
Assessment 4.29
4.14 First ED Glasgow Eye Opening 4.30
Component Assessment 4.31
4.15 First ED Glasgow Verbal Component 4.32
Assessment
Assessment Data
First ED Glasgow Motor
Component Assessment
Date/Time of First ED Glasgow
Coma Scale Assessment
First ED Systolic Blood Pressure
Date/Time of First ED Systolic
Blood Pressure
First ED Diastolic Blood Pressure
First ED Heart Rate
First ED Heart Rate Method
Date/Time of First ED Heart Rate
First ED Respiratory Rate
Date/Time of First ED Respiratory
Rate
First ED Temperature Reading
First ED Temperature Reading Route
Date/Time of First ED Temperature
Reading
Measured Weight in ED
Pregnancy Status Reported in ED
Date of Last Tetanus Immunization
Medication Allergy Reported in ED
Section 5 - ED History and Physical Examination Data
5.01 Date/Time of First ED Practitioner Evaluation
5.02 Date/Time of Illness or Injury Onset
5.03 Injury Incident Description
5.04 Coded Cause of Injury
5.05 Injury Incident Location Type
5.06 Injury Activity
5.07 Injury Intent
5.08 Safety Equipment Use
5.09 Current Therapeutic Medication
5.10 Current Therapeutic Medication Dose
5.11 Current Therapeutic Medication Ut
5.12 Current Therapeutic Medication
Schedule
5.13 Current Therapeutic Medication Rt
5.14 ED Clinical Finding Type
5.15 ED Clinical Finding
5.16 Date/Time ED Clinical Finding
5.17 ED Clinical Finding Practitioner ID
5.18 ED Clinical Finding Practitioner
Type
5.19 ED Clinical Finding Data Source
Section 6 - ED Procedure and Result Data
ED Procedure Indication
ED Procedure
Date/Time ED Procedure Ordered
Date/Time ED Procedure Starts
Date/Time ED Procedure Ends
ED Procedure Practitioner ID
6.07 ED Procedure Practitioner Type
6.08 Date/Time ED Procedure Result
Reported
6.09 ED Procedure Result Type
6.10 ED Procedure Result
6.01
6.02
6.03
6.04
6.05
6.06
Section 7 - ED Medication Data
Date/Time ED Medication Ordered
ED Medication Ordering Practitioner ID
ED Medication Ordering Practitioner Type
ED Medication
ED Medication Dose
ED Medication Dose Units
ED Medication Schedule
7.08 ED Medication Route
7.09 Date/Time ED Medication Starts
7.10 Date/Time ED Medication Stops
7.11 ED Medication Administering
Practitioner ID
7.12 ED Medication Administering
Practitioner Type
Section 8 - ED Disposition and Diagnosis Data
8.01 Date/Time of Recorded ED Disposition
8.02 ED Disposition
8.03 Inpatient Practitioner ID
8.04 Inpatient Practitioner Type
8.05 Facility Receiving ED Patient
8.06 Date/Time Patient Departs ED
8.07 ED Follow-Up Care Assistance
8.08 Referral at ED Disposition
8.09 ED Referral Practitioner Name
8.10 ED Referral Practitioner ID
8.11 ED Referral Practitioner Type
8.12 ED Referral Organization
8.13 ED Discharge Medication Order Type
8.14 ED Discharge Medication Ordering
Practitioner ID
8.15 ED Discharge Medication Ordering
Practitioner Type
8.16 ED Discharge Medication
8.17 ED Discharge Medication Dose
8.18 ED Discharge Medication Dose Units
8.19 ED Discharge Medication Schedule
8.20 ED Discharge Medication Route
8.21 Amount of ED Discharge Medication
to be Dispensed
8.22 Number of ED Discharge Medication
Refills
8.23 ED Disposition Diagnosis
8.24 ED Disposition Diagnosis Code
8.25 ED Disposition Diagnosis
Practitioner ID
8.26 ED Disposition Diagnosis
Practitioner Type
8.27 ED Service Level
8.28 ED Service Level Practitioner ID
8.29 ED Service Level Practitioner Type
8.30 Patient Problem Assessed in ED
Outcome Observation
8.31 ED Outcome Observation
8.32 Date/Time of ED Outcome
8.33 ED Outcome Observation
8.34 ED Outcome Observation
Practitioner
8.35 ED Patient Satisfaction Report Type
8.36 ED Patient Satisfaction Report
7.52 Visual Presentation Layer
Using CareWeb and the DEEDS dataset a more complete Emergency Department record such as the
following can be generated. (Figure 16)
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8. Organizational and Institutional issues
During the development CareWebTM , we encountered many technical challenges which we solved by
adhering to existing standards and maintaining an object oriented architecture. However, implementing a
multi-institutional medical record using new technologies required an equal effort to address organizational
and institution challenges.
The first challenge was to create consensus among all constituencies impacted by the deployment of a web-
based medical record. Implementing CareWeb required collaboration with and approval from the
Information Systems organization including the directors of Informatics and Advanced Technologies,
Technology Management, Clinical Systems, Financial Systems, Strategic Projects, Community Practices,
Information Rresource Management and the Chief Information Officer. Deploying CareWeb required
collaboration with and approval from the Security Officer and Corporate Communications. Finally,
CareWeb required the support of the ultimate users of the system, the physician and nursing staff of the
CareGroup Hospitals.
The second challenge was to mobilize the resources to transition CareWebTM from proof of concept to a
production system. Issues include administration of security hardware tokens, providing twenty-four
hour per day, seven day per week support and providing dedicated hardware systems. We are currently
allocating these tasks to existing information systems personnel.
The final challenge was to create an organizational security policy. Any technical implementation must be
complemented by a strong organizational policy to sanction those who inappropriately access healthcare
data. The Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center has a long standing tradition of protecting patient
confidentiality within its legacy systems and organizational policies are already in place. This greatly
facilitated the implementation of the CareWeb security architecture and minimized the barriers to
implementation which would be found at institutions without such existing policies.
9. CONCLUSION
CareWebTM provides a rapidly deployable, low cost architecture which leverages the strengths of existing
institutions merging to form an integrated health care delivery system.
Our experience with the CareWebTM system has demonstrated the feasibility of using the web to allow
access to longitudinal patient record data which is distributed across multiple sites, providers and
institutions. We have demonstrated that a security architecture can be built around this system to provide
a balance between ease of access to emergency health care data and protecting patient confidentiality.
This security architecture builds on the work of others to create the first web-based implementation of the
National Research Council's recommendations for present and future security practices.
We have learned many valuable lessions during the development of CareWebTM. First, the organizational
barriers to deploying a secure web-based medical record can outweigh the technical challenges.
Continuing reports of flaws in internet security give a public impression that the web is not a suitable
environment for sensitive information and this creates difficulty in obtaining institutional support.
Consensus for deploying such a system must include information systems personnel, hospital
administrators, public relations and the clinicians themselves.
Secondly, the existing hospital infrastructure provides a strict limitation on the types of technology that
may be deployed. Although the Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center has a campus-wide high speed
network infrastructure, many machines are incapable of running the current versions of web browsers,
preventing the use of Java and browser-side scripting languages.
The CareWebTM security architecture offers an early trial implementation of several potential strategies for
delivering secure medical records via the Internet. This is especially relevant given that the Health
Insurance and Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (Kassebaum-Kennedy) requires that the Secretary
of Health and Human Services submit to Congress, by August of 1997, detailed recommendations on
protecting the privacy of individually identifiable health information.
The CareWeb implementation project was a diverse and challenging experience. As indicated in this
report, deploying a cross institutional medical record via the world wide web required :
* Legacy System interfacing techniques
* Implementation of numerous of new internet technologies
* Translation of provider requests and legacy responses into Health Level Seven
* Token-based security technologies
* Leveraging existing hardware and software infrastructure
* Evaluation of organizational special interests
* Study of cryptography technologies
* Local and multi-instutional auditing strategies
* Enterprise-wide collaboration
* Evaluation of health care provider needs and behaviors
* Public relations efforts to maximize patient education and achieve consent for use of CareWeb
Substantial progress has been made on projects derived from the CareWeb technology. It is our hope that
these projects will to improve the functionality and utility of CareWeb and most importantly, will benefit
patient care.
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